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“For Greater Certainty”: Calibrating 
Investment Treaties to Protect Foreign 






This article presents a menu of options for States to calibrate the 
precise terms of the most contentious provision of international 
investment agreements (IIAs):1 the indirect expropriation clause.2  
 
 †   Mr. Mellske is an Associate at Three Crowns, LLP in Washington, DC, 
where he focuses on the resolution of international, commercial, investor-State, and 
State-State disputes.  He holds a Juris Doctor and Master of Laws in International 
& Comparative Law from Duke University School of Law, a Master of Arts in 
Political Science from Illinois State University, and a Bachelor of Arts, magna cum 
laude, in English and Spanish from Illinois Wesleyan University.  The views 
expressed herein are made in the author’s personal capacity and do not necessarily 
reflect the position of Three Crowns, LLP. 
 1.  By way of background, an important dimension of globalization in recent 
decades, particularly in the 1990s, has been the proliferation of thousands of IIAs 
meant to promote and protect foreign investment worldwide.  IIAs are treaties 
between and among sovereign States.  Some are bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs); others are free trade agreements (FTAs) that contain a chapter on 
investment.  See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement ch. 11, December 17, 
1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].  IIAs 
provide substantive protections for the treatment of the foreign investors of each 
contracting State in the territory of the other State.  Id., art. 1116.  Disputes 
between foreign investors and host States are to be resolved by international 
arbitration, outside the courts of either State party to the treaty, to ensure 
impartiality.  See id., arts. 1119–38.  Another purpose of investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) by arbitration is to allow the political branches of the respective 
States to avoid entering the fray of an investment dispute and thereby preserve their 
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IIAs entered into in the era of globalization provide almost no textual 
guidance to arbitral tribunals to determine whether a government 
measure, including a measure to protect public health, constitutes a 
“regulatory taking” (in U.S. parlance) of a foreign investor’s private 
property for which compensation must be paid.  However, in 
interpreting these treaty provisions over several decades, investment 
tribunals have developed specific principles—although with varying 
standards—to evaluate whether an indirect expropriation has 
occurred.3  Now, for every new, renegotiated, or “next generation,” 
IIA, States may survey the jurisprudence, select from among the 
established principles, and set the standard for each future agreement 
by expressly invoking the relevant language used by the tribunals.4  
By drafting increasingly sophisticated treaties, States can provide 
 
broader diplomatic relations.   
 2.  See Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?, 11 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 64, 65 (2002) (“[T]he single most important development in 
state practice has become the issue of indirect expropriation . . . .”); Ursula 
Kriebaum, Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the 
State, 8 J. WORLD INVESTMENT & TRADE 717, 718 (2007) (“[T]he question where 
to draw the line between a non-compensable regulatory measure and an indirect 
expropriation requiring compensation has gained increasing importance.  Today it 
is one of the biggest challenges for arbitrators as well as academics.”); Katia 
Yannaca-Small, Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: How to Draw 
the Line?, in ARBITRATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS: A 
GUIDE TO THE KEY ISSUES 446 (Katia Yannaca-Small ed. 2010) (“[T]he debate has 
shifted [from disputes on direct expropriation related to the nationalizations that 
marked the 70s and 80s] to the application of indirect expropriation to regulatory 
measures aimed at protecting the environment, health, and other welfare interests of 
society.”). 
 3.  See Gabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Arbitral Precedent: Dream, Necessity or 
Excuse?: The 2006 Freshfields Lecture, 23 ARB. INT’L 357, 368–73 (noting that 
while ISDS does not provide for a system of binding precedents, “there is a 
progressive emergence of rules through lines of consistent cases on certain issues;” 
however, “there are still contradictory outcomes on [some cases].”); G.C. Christie, 
What Constitutes a Taking of Property Under International Law? 38 BRIT. Y.B. 
INT’L L. (1962), reprinted in R. DOAK BISHOP ET AL., FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
DISPUTES: CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY 894–95 (2005) (“It is evident 
that the question of what kind of interference short of outright expropriation 
constitutes a ‘taking’ under international law presents a situation where the 
common law method of case by case development is pre-eminently the best 
method, in fact probably the only method, of legal development.  This article has 
attempted . . . to give some general indication of the stage of legal development 
which has been reached, and the lines along which further development may be 
expected.”). 
 4.  Meg Kinnear, ICSID Secretary-General, Keynote Address at the Hogan 
Lovells and Notre Dame Law School Lecture: The Next Generation of Investment 
Treaties and Their Impact on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Feb. 12, 2015) 
(noting that substantive obligations under new IIAs are being clarified based on 25 
years of experience and a thoughtful response to the jurisprudence; new IIAs are 
being “carefully calibrated” to achieve the States’ purpose). 
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future tribunals, investors, and themselves greater certainty regarding 
the substantive rules that a tribunal will apply in a given case.5 
II. CONTEXT AND CONTROVERSY OVER INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
In one ongoing polemic, Australia and Uruguay’s prohibitions 
on the use of trademarks on tobacco products drew investment-treaty 
claims by Philip Morris and have fueled a global debate about the 
future of investor-State arbitration.  On the one hand, the two 
countries believe the prohibitions are within their sovereign power to 
protect public health from the dangers of tobacco use.6  On the other 
hand, Philip Morris claims indirect expropriation of its investments 
resulting from the government’s impairment of its intellectual 
property rights in violation of applicable IIAs.7 
 
 5.  This is not to say that States can prescribe the outcome of a case through 
the text of a treaty.  As Professor Jan Paulsson has said, “perfect predictability is an 
illusion.”  See Jan Paulsson, President, London Court of International Arbitration, 
Speaker at the ICSID, OECD and UNCTAD Symposium: Indirect Expropriation: Is 
the Right to Regulate at Risk? (Dec. 12, 2005).  What States can do, and are doing 
today, is draft new IIAs in which the State’s intent is much clearer.  They are 
refining substantive obligations, particularly with respect to indirect expropriation.  
The overall goal is that the treaty is much more clear as to when there is and is not 
a breach, which is better for investors and States alike.  See Kinnear, supra note 4. 
 6.  Uruguay’s Decree No. 284/008 describes in its preamble the importance of 
regulating tobacco consumption in the country. The preamble notes:  (I) that 
nicotine from tobacco is a highly addictive drug; (II) that chronic consumption of 
tobacco constitutes a dependency or addiction; (III) that smoke deriving from 
tobacco is a type A carcinogenic.  Ministry of Public Health Decree (No. 284/008) 
(2008).  In connection with the tobacco legislation, Uruguay’s Senator Luis Gallo 
stated that: “There is every reason in the public interest to approve this law.  We are 
protecting future generations.  It is fully proven that consumption and exposure to 
tobacco have very serious health consequences.”  Uruguay Prohíbe la Publicidad y 
Exhibición de Cigarrillos en Tiendas, EL MUNDO, May 6,  2014 (translation by the 
author).  Likewise, Australia’s government has publicly stated through the 
Department of Health that the plain-packaging regulations will reduce tobacco 
consumption and improve the health of Australia’s population.  Introduction of 
Tobacco Plain Packaging Law, AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T HEALTH, (Aug. 11, 2014),  
http://www.health.gov.au/internet/main/publishing.nsf/Content/tobacco-plain. 
 7.  See e.g., Philip Morris Asia Ltd. v. Commonwealth of Australia, Case No. 
2012-12, Notice of Claim, ¶¶ 10a–10c (Perm. Ct. Arb. June 27, 2011), 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0664.pdf (“Plain 
packaging legislation will result in the expropriation of PM Asia’s investments due 
to the substantial deprivation of the intellectual property and goodwill, the 
consequent undermining of the economic rationale of its investments and 
substantial destruction of the value of PM Australia and PML.”).  As of the 
submission of this article, the arbitration proceedings filed by Philip Morris against 
Australia on 21 November 2011 are pending at the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA).  Following a series of procedural orders, in April 2014 the tribunal granted 
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The controversy has its origins in a similar dispute in the 1990s, 
when Philip Morris lobbied Canada’s legislature to abandon a plain-
packaging tobacco bill under threat of investment-treaty claims.8  
Although Canada initially retreated with respect to the plain 
packaging legislation, in 2004, Canada moved forward with a new 
model BIT containing an Annex on expropriation.  The Annex 
provides more detailed language regarding indirect expropriation, as 
well as a specific carve-out for measures taken to protect public 
welfare objectives such as public health.9  The Annex follows closely 
the U.S. Model BIT developed earlier that same year, which codified 
the regulatory takings test in U.S. case law.10 
Anticipating Philip Morris’s claims, Australia’s government 
initially declared in 2011 that Australia would simply no longer 
include provisions for investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) in any 
new IIAs.11  Some observers argued that the lack of clarity in the text 
of the treaties was allowing investors to assert undue influence over 
 
Australia’s request to bifurcate the proceedings to decide the questions of 
jurisdiction and merits in separate phases.  Practical Law Arbitration: What to 
Expect in 2015, PRAC. L. ARB., Jan. 7, 2015, Practical Law Article 6-585-
8833; Philip Morris, No. 2012-12, Procedural Order No. 8, at 49, 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw3247.pdf. 
 8.  Thomas A. Faunce, Plain Packaging in a Broader Regulatory Framework: 
Preventing False Claims and Investor-State Lobbying, in PUBLIC HEALTH AND 
PLAIN PACKAGING OF CIGARETTES: LEGAL ISSUES 200, 207 (Tania Voon et al. eds., 
2012). 
 9.  Can., Canada 2004 Model BIT (2004), annex B.13(1)(c), 
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf; 
Andrew Newcombe, Canada’s New Model Foreign Investment Protection 
Agreement, 30 CAN. COUNCIL ON INT’L L. BULLETIN 9, 11 (2004),  
http://ccil-ccdi.squarespace.com/ccil-newsletters/30%20CCIL-
CCDI%20Bulletin%203%202004.pdf. 
 10.  Newcombe, supra note 9. In the U.S., the general rule is that the 
government need not pay compensation for mere regulation of property.  
Exceptions to the rule are when the regulation takes the form of a physical 
occupation of real property, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhttan CATV Corp., 458 
U.S. 419, 441 (1982); the regulation denies the property owner all economic use of 
his land, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027–28 
(1992); or the regulation substantially impairs the economic value of the whole 
property and interferes with distinct, investment-backed expectations, and is of an 
arbitrary or discriminatory nature or confers a benefit on the State, Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 133 n. 29 (1978).  
Regulations enacted to prevent harm to the public are non-compensable.  
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407,409–410 (1915). 
 11.  AUSTL. GOV’T DEP’T FOREIGN AFF. & TRADE, GILLARD GOVERNMENT 
TRADE POLICY STATEMENT: TRADING OUR WAY TO MORE JOBS AND PROSPERITY 
14 (2011), available at http://www.acci.asn.au/getattachment/b9d3cfae-fc0c-4c2a-
a3df-3f58228daf6d/Gillard-Government-Trade-Policy-Statement.aspx; Sebastian 
Perry, Australia to scrap investor-state provisions, GLOBAL ARB. REV. (Apr. 18, 
2011), http://globalarbitrationreview.com/news/article/29405/. 
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States, resulting in regulatory chill, and that the rights of third parties 
could be implicated but not vindicated through ISDS.12  These 
commentators therefore opposed ISDS and argued that FTAs like the 
forthcoming Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)13 and Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)14 ought to omit ISDS all 
together.15 
After further inquiry, however, Australia’s new government 
recognized the proposition that “[t]reaty-based ISDS is not a perfect 
system, but it can be improved . . . mainly by carefully negotiating 
and drafting BITs and FTAs.”16  On this basis, Australia proceeded to 
enter into an FTA with Korea in 2014 which includes a chapter on 
investments—notably, with substantially revised language in an 
Annex on indirect expropriation.  Likewise, Uruguay has lately 
adopted three BITs which contain Annexes on expropriation: with the 
United States in 2005; with India in 2008; and with South Korea in 
2009.17  Similarly, Uruguay is now negotiating a new BIT with 
 
 12.  See Roger Alford, University of Notre Dame, Commentator at the Hogan 
Lovells and Notre Dame Law School Lecture: The Next Generation of Investment 
Treaties and Their Impact on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 13.  As of April 2015, aspects of the TPP are still being negotiated.  U.S. 
officials are confident that the treaty will be finalized in the coming months. 
Nathan Jensen, Experts See a Republican Senate and Fast-track Authority for 




 14.  As of January 2015, TTIP negotiations have established that the treaty will 
provide for ISDS, but that the precise form and scope of the ISDS provisions 
remain to be decided.  Practical Law Arbitration: What to expect in 2015, supra 
note 7.  However, opposition to the trade agreement has been growing as some 
members of the European Union have rejected the inclusion of ISDS provisions.  
Manuel Pérez-Rocha, When Corporations Sue Governments, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/opinion/when-corporations-sue-
governments.html?_r=0. 
 15.  See generally American Society of International Law, Panel Discussion: 
The Protection of Individual and Collective Rights in Investment Treaty Arbitration 
(June 17, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2IRt5smbRdo (including 
remarks by the author on whether ISDS should be included in free trade 
agreements). 
 16.  AUSTL. SENATE FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DEFENCE AND TRADE LEGISLATION 
COMMITTEE, TRADE AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT (PROTECTING THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST) BILL 2014, at 16 (2014). 
 17.  See Kinnear, supra note 4; UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS NAVIGATOR, 
http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA/CountryBits/225#iiaInnerMenu (last 
visited Dec. 6, 2014) [hereinafter UNCTAD]. 
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Japan.18 
The path chosen by Australia and Uruguay is appealing.  After 
all, the primary law of international investment is in the text of the 
applicable treaty.19  Judicial decisions and scholarly articles are 
“subsidiary” to treaties, custom, and general principles,20 and treaties 
prevail over prior inconsistent customary law and general 
principles.21  The approach of careful treaty drafting therefore puts 
the ball back in the courts of States, where they and they alone—not 
foreign investors and not arbitral tribunals—exercise the sovereign 
power of the pen to write the rules for foreign investment.  Thus, with 
2,300 IIAs providing for ISDS already in force, and with hundreds 
more pending approval,22 the academic debate would appear to have 
been settled long ago in favor of ISDS, with few exceptions.  The real 
issue now is not an up or down political vote about whether ISDS 
ought to exist, but rather a thoughtful legal discussion to answer the 
question: what exactly should these agreements say?23 
 
 18.  Uruguay y Japón avanzan en negociaciones para concretar acuerdos de 
inversión, DIARIO LA REPÚBLICA , May 2,  2014, 
http://www.republica.com.uy/uruguay-y-japon-avanzan-en-negociaciones-para-
concretar-acuerdos-deinversion/453930/. 
 19.  Due to the growing number of treaties and their broadening scope of 
subject matter, treaties have become “the most important source of international 
law.”  BARRY E. CARTER, et al., INTERNATIONAL LAW 93 (4th ed. 2003). 
 20.  Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice provides:  
“1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply:  
a. international conventions, whether general or particular, 
establishing rules expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as 
law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the 
teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations, as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law.  
2. This provision shall not prejudice the power of the Court to decide a 
case ex aequo et bono, if the parties agree thereto [(emphasis added)].”   
Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055, 3 Bevans 1179. 
 21.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102 cmt. j (1987) (“[A] rule established by agreement supersedes for them a prior 
inconsistent rule of customary international law.”). 
 22.  UNCTAD, supra note 17, http://investmentpolichub.unctad.org/IIA. 
 23.  See Inter-Am. Dialogue, Why Has Dispute Resolution Become Such a Hot 
Topic?, LATIN AMERICA ADVISOR (Aug. 25, 2014) (including comments by the 
author).  Even critics of ISDS agree that “it is important to be clear on just what 
these investment treaties do and do not mean.”  Lise Johnson & Oleksandr Volkov, 
State Liability for Regulatory Change: How International Investment Rules Are 
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III. ANALYSIS 
An analysis of the textual evolution of specific investment 
treaties is necessary to understand the approach taken by Australia 
and Uruguay with respect to indirect expropriation. This section will 
examine: (A) the old IIAs under which Philip Morris brought its 
claims; (B) important principles related to indirect expropriation as 
developed by international tribunals since first generation IIAs were 
adopted; and, finally, (C) the extent to which Australia and Uruguay 
have incorporated and defined these principles in their new treaties, 
and their potential impact on future challenges to government 
measures to protect public health. 
 A. Old Treaties 
Philip Morris (through its subsidiaries in Hong Kong and 
Switzerland) brought its claims against Australia and Uruguay under 
the Australia – Hong Kong and Uruguay – Switzerland BITs of 1993 
and 1988, respectively.  Article 6 of the Hong-Kong – Australia BIT 
of 1993 reads: 
Expropriation: “Investors of either Contracting Party 
shall not be deprived of their investments nor 
subjected to measures having effect equivalent to such 
deprivation in the area of the other Contracting Party 
except under due process of law, for a public purpose 
related to the internal needs of that Party, on a non-
discriminatory basis, and against compensation.”24 
Similarly, Article 5(1) of the Switzerland – Uruguay BIT of 
1988 provides that: 
Dispossession, compensation: “Neither of the 
Contracting Parties shall take, either directly or 
indirectly, measures of expropriation, nationalization 
or any other measure having the same nature or the 
same effect against investments belonging to investors 
of the other Contracting Party, unless the measures are 
taken for the public benefit as established by law, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, and under due process of 
law, and provided that provisions be made for 
 
Overriding Domestic Law, 5 INV. TREATY NEWS 3, 3 (2014). 
 24.  Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, Austl.-H.K., 
art. 6, Sept. 15, 1993, 1770 U.N.T.S. 385. 
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effective and adequate compensation.”25 
These treaties provide substantially similar clauses on 
expropriation.  The clauses are each rather terse.  They do not 
expressly use the term “indirect expropriation,” much less define it; 
they only allude to indirect expropriation by speaking of measures 
equivalent to expropriation.  And the treaties provide that the fact that 
a State acts in the public interest only helps to make an otherwise 
unlawful expropriation lawful; but even then, compensation is due.26  
These clauses otherwise give no guidance as to any factors a tribunal 
should consider when evaluating the complex question of whether a 
government regulation amounts to an expropriation of an investor’s 
property interests. 
Of course, it may have been the drafters’ intention to keep these 
provisions vague, since the immediate objective of politicians who 
signed and ratified the first treaties was to promote investment.  They 
may have preferred to leave it to investment tribunals to interpret the 
provisions—and to their successors to deal with the political and 
financial costs of any resulting disputes.  By contrast, it is evident 
that contemporary politicians are carefully drafting new IIAs with a 
more balanced view to both promoting investment and preserving 
sovereign rights to regulate.  They can do so by looking to the 
jurisprudence of investment tribunals who have analyzed—and 
derived meaning from—the “old treaties” under international law. 
 B. Intervening Jurisprudence 
Over several decades, international tribunals have interpreted 
indirect expropriation clauses in IIAs to include various concepts and 
principles which both safeguard and limit State regulatory actions 
affecting foreign investors.  First, the jurisprudence shows that a 
tribunal might name and define “indirect expropriation” in terms of 
the degree (total or partial) and duration (permanent or temporary) of 
the interference with property rights, and, with respect to an 
enterprise, in terms of certain control factors.  Second, a tribunal 
might then apply the sole effects doctrine to consider only the 
economic impact of the measure, or, in the alternative, in might 
consider the purpose and character of a measure in addition to its 
 
 25.  Agreement on the Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, 
Switz.-Uru., art. 5(1), Oct. 7, 1988, 1976 U.N.T.S. 389 . 
 26.  Payment of compensation (usually fair market value) is a condition for the 
lawfulness of an expropriation.  An unlawful compensation requires the State to 
pay damages to wipe out all consequences of the illegal act under the “Chorzów 
Principle.”  Kriebaum, supra note 2, at 720. 
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economic effects.  In the case of the latter balancing test, a tribunal 
might consider whether the State is acting properly within its police 
powers (defined either broadly or narrowly by the tribunal) or is 
instead improperly conferring a direct benefit on itself or third 
persons, taking measures which are not bona fide, or taking measures 
without regard to proportionality between means and ends.  Third, a 
tribunal might also analyze the investor’s legitimate (or reasonable, 
investment-backed) expectations.  If so, the tribunal might require 
that those expectations are based on the government’s specific 
assurances (defined either broadly or narrowly by the tribunal).  The 
tribunal may also consider whether an investor’s expectations depend 
on the degree to which the relevant industry is already heavily 
regulated.  Fourth, a tribunal might exempt the State from liability 
for measures taken to protect the public welfare, such as health, 
safety, and the environment, at least in emergency situations.  An 
analysis of each of these principles suggests how they might be 
specified and calibrated within the text of a new generation of IIA 
provisions on indirect expropriation, particularly as they affect the 
ability of States to regulate private property to protect public health. 
 1. Definitions: Degree, Duration, and Control 
Both direct and indirect expropriation involve “the taking or 
depriving of a foreign investor’s property by a host State.”27  The 
difference is that direct expropriation occurs when there is a taking or 
deprivation of an investor’s property,28 whereas indirect expropriation 
occurs without the transfer of an investor’s ownership rights.29  The 
widely accepted definitions for indirect expropriation include 
measures “tantamount” to expropriation or having an “equivalent 
effect.”30  Based on this language, many tribunals have set the 
threshold for a finding of indirect expropriation where the deprivation 
or interference with property rights is “substantial.”31  Consequently, 
 
 27. Stephen Olynyk, A Balanced Approach to Distinguishing Between 
Legitimate Regulation and Indirect Expropriation in Investor-State Arbitration, 15 
INT’L TRADE & BUS. L. REV. 254, 262–63 (2012). 
 28.  Id. at 263.  
 29.  Id. 
 30.  RUDOLF DOLZER & CHRISTOPH SCHREUER, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 93 (2008); see also, e.g., NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1) 
(“No party may . . . take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation 
of such an investment.”); Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, U.K.-Sierra Leone, art. 5, Jan. 13, 2000, 2186 U.N.T.S. 3 
(“Investments of nationals or companies of either Contracting Party shall not be . . . 
subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation.”). 
 31.  Telenor Mobile Communicatinos A.S. v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID 
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questions about degree and duration remain.32  For instance, where 
the investment is an enterprise, tribunals may simply look to whether 
the investor retains some control of its business in the face of the 
measure.33  These are typical of the types of issues which could be 
defined more precisely in the text of an IIA, using language from 
arbitral decisions. 
In terms of degree, the tribunal in TECMED v. Mexico adopted a 
stringent articulation of the definition of indirect expropriation as 
covering measures that, “radically deprive [the claimant] of the 
economical use and enjoyment of its investments, as if the rights 
related thereto – such as the income or benefits related to the 
[investment] or its exploitation – had ceased to exist[;] [the measures] 
are irreversible and permanent . . . [and] any form of exploitation . . . 
has disappeared.”34  Other tribunals have set a seemingly lower 
standard to include mere interference with the use of property which 
 
Case No. ARB/04/15, Award, ¶ 65 (Sept. 13, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 603 (2006) 
(“[T]he interference with the investor’s rights must be such as substantially to 
deprive the investor of the economic value, use or enjoyment of its investment.”); 
Saipem S.p.A. v. People’s Republic of Bangladesh, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/7, 
Award, ¶ 133 (June 30, 2009) (“[C]ase law considers that there is expropriation if 
the deprivation is substantial, as it is in the present case.”); Compañía de Aguas del 
Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.11 (Aug. 20, 2007) (“[I]t is not infrequent in cases of 
indirect expropriation that the investor suffers a substantial deprivation of value of 
its investment.”). 
 32.  See, e.g., Tza Yap Shum v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/6, 
Award, ¶ 156 (July 7, 2011) (“[T]he interim measures resulted in the expropriation 
of the Claimant’s investment in view of the intensity of the impact and the 
duration.”); Telenor Mobile Communications, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, ¶ 70 
(“[T]he determinative factors are the intensity and duration of the economic 
deprivation suffered by the investor.”). 
 33.  DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 30, at 107 (“A number of Awards 
suggest that continued control of an enterprise by the investor strongly militates 
against a finding that an indirect expropriation has occurred.”). 
 34.  Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, 
ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, ¶ 115 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 
(2004); see also Consortium RFCC v. Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/00/6, Award, ¶ 69 (Dec. 22, 2003), 20 ICSID Rev. 391 (2005) (finding that 
an indirect expropriation exists where the measures have “substantial effects of an 
intensity that reduces and/or removes the legitimate benefits related with the use of 
the rights targeted by the measure to an extent that they render their further 
possession useless”) (emphasis added); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17, Award, ¶ 270 (June 21, 2011) (recognizing that 
indirect expropriation may lie where “restrictions on the use of property go so far 
as to leave the investor with only a nominal property right”); BG Group Plc. v. 
Republic of Argentina, Award, ¶ 261 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 24, 2007) 
(“[M]easures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to such an extent 
that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been 
expropriated . . . .”). 
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has the effect of depriving the owner, “in whole or in significant 
part,” of the use or economic benefit thereof.35  The Restatement 
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States also sets an 
apparently lower threshold to encompass not only total deprivation of 
property rights, but also “unreasonable interference” and “undue 
delays.”36 So it is not clear from the treaties or the jurisprudence 
whether the interference must be absolute, or whether it may be 
something less.  Even the Pope & Talbot and S.D. Myers tribunals, 
which refused to expand the definition of indirect expropriation under 
NAFTA beyond that which is strictly equivalent to direct 
expropriation, supposed that “in some contexts and circumstances, it 
would be appropriate to view a deprivation as amounting to an 
expropriation, even if it were partial”—presumably in cases of 
“creeping expropriation.”37  Even where States require total 
interference with property rights, lesser interferences may still qualify 
as a violation of the Fair & Equitable Treatment standard of many 
IIAs.  In this way, an additional purpose of clarifying treaty 
provisions is to steer a tribunal away from conflating the distinct 
protections within a treaty.38 
Insofar as the duration of a measure bears on its degree of 
impact, the tribunal in LG&E Energy v. Argentina emphasized that 
 
 35.  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 103 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001) (finding 
that Mexico’s decree designating Metalclad’s landfill site as an ecological preserve 
prevented the investor from using its property as a landfill) (emphasis added); see 
also Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 219, 225 (1984) (“A deprivation or taking of property may occur under 
international law through interference by a state in the use of that property or with 
the enjoyment of its benefits . . . .”); Harza Eng’g Co. v. Iran, 1 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. 
Rep. 499, 504 (1982) (finding that a taking of property may occur where a 
government has “interfered unreasonably with the use of property”). 
 36.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
712 cmt. g (1987). 
 37.  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, ¶¶ 283, 286 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000) (citing with approval Pope & Talbot Inc. v. 
Government of Canada, Interim Award, ¶ 104 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 26, 
2000)).  Creeping expropriation is death by a thousand cuts.  It is a situation 
whereby “a series of acts attributable to the State over a period of time culminate in 
the expropriatory taking of such property.”  Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/00/9, Award, ¶20.22 (Sept. 16, 2003). 
 38.  See, e.g., El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/15, Award, ¶ 227–30 (Oct. 31, 2011) (noting a lack of 
distinction between various provisions of IIAs, including that “legitimate 
expectation” should be analyzed under the fair and equitable treatment standard 
rather than as a factor of indirect expropriation).  Legitimate expectations under 
indirect expropriation is discussed in this article further below.  See infra Part 
III.B.3. 
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“[g]enerally, the expropriation must be permanent, that is to say, it 
cannot have a temporary nature.”39  However, other tribunals 
recognized that an indirect expropriation could occur based on 
temporary interferences with property rights.  The tribunal in Middle 
East Cement v. Egypt considered that four months of regulatory 
deprivation of “parts of the value of [the claimant’s] investment” was 
sufficient to constitute an indirect expropriation.40  The tribunal in 
Wena Hotels v. Egypt found that exclusion of the investor from 
management of its hotels for almost one year constituted an 
expropriation.41  Still, other tribunals, while admitting that temporary 
interferences could constitute a breach, would require a longer period 
of interference.  In Burlington v. Ecuador, the tribunal, citing 
Paushok v. Mongolia, stated that losses for one year were not 
sufficient to find expropriation, and that “the future prospects of 
earning a commercial return” would have to be evaluated.42  The S.D. 
Myers tribunal decided that even eighteen months of delayed 
opportunity was not long enough.43  Thus, States could expressly 
indicate in an IIA whether a claim of indirect expropriation requires a 
permanent interference with property rights, or whether a temporary 
interference is sufficient.  In the latter instance, States could even 
specify a minimum time period for the interference. 
Where the investment is an enterprise, “not all government 
regulatory activity that makes it . . . uneconomical to continue a 
particular business[] is an [indirect] expropriation,”44 so long as the 
investor retains control of the business.  The Pope & Talbot tribunal 
and subsequent tribunals have considered the relevant “control 
factors” to include: (i) management of operations, (ii) administration 
of the business, (iii) distribution of dividends, (iv) appointment of 
managers, and (v) control over company property.45  In Feldman v. 
 
 39.  LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶ 193 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006). 
 40.  Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/6, Award, ¶ 107 (Apr. 12, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 
602 (2003). 
 41.  Wena Hotels Ltd. v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, 
Award, ¶ 99 (Dec. 8, 2000). 
 42.  Burlington Resources Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/05, Decision on Liability, ¶ 399 (Dec. 14, 2012). 
 43.  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, ¶ 284 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000). 
 44.  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 112 
(Dec. 16, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 488. 
 45.  Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Government of Canada, Interim Award, ¶¶ 100–101 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 26, 2000) (finding that the government’s imposition 
of quotas and tariffs on exports which reduced the investor’s profits, but which 
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Mexico, for example, the tribunal found no indirect expropriation 
where the Mexican government denied the Claimant rebates of excise 
taxes on the export of tobacco products, which deprived the Claimant 
completely and permanently of the economic benefit of that business 
(i.e., a gross profit of less than US$0.10/unit), including because the 
claimant retained control of his investment and remained in business 
with the right to export other products with rebates.46  With respect to 
investments that are businesses, States could expressly require the 
investor to show interference with the specific Pope & Talbot 
“control factors.” 
Considering the foregoing variations in the definition of indirect 
expropriation with respect to degree, duration, and control, two 
commentators recently tallied nine different formulations of indirect 
expropriation and resolved to leave it to arbitrators to decide “the 
meaning of expropriation” based on the circumstances of each 
particular case.47  Yet even these commentators recognize that “[t]he 
law can provide a basis for answering the question.”48  In each of 
these points of the definition of indirect expropriation—degree, 
duration, and control—States have the ability to provide additional 
clarity based on principles derived from the jurisprudence and 
thereby make it easier for arbitrators to fulfil the first requirement of 
treaty interpretation: ascertaining the meaning of the text.49 
 
nevertheless allowed the investor to continue to export substantial quantities of 
product and earn substantial profits on those sales abroad, was not an indirect 
expropriation); see also PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektric Üretim ve 
Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/5, Award, 
¶¶ 278-80 (Jan. 19, 2007) (applying the Pope & Talbot control factors). 
 46. Marvin Feldman, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, ¶¶ 112–13; see also 
CMS Gas Transmission Co. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8, 
Award, ¶¶ 258-59 (May 12, 2005) (finding no indirect expropriation where 
measures by the government allowed the company to operate normally); Starrett 
Housing Corp v. Iran, Interlocutory Award, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 122, 154 
(1983) (finding indirect expropriation where, by government decree, the Iranian 
Minister of Housing appointed a temporary manager of the investor’s company and 
thereby deprived the investor of effective use, control, and benefits of its property). 
 47.  L. Yves Fortier & Stephen L. Drymer, Indirect Expropriation in the Law of 
International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor, 19 ICSID 
REV., 293, 306 (2004) (finding a “profusion of voices” on the definition of indirect 
expropriation; wondering, “What is one to make of this babel?”). 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty 
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose.”); see also RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 6 (2008) 
(“[T]he text must be presumed to be an authentic expression of the intention of the 
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 2. Sole Effects Versus Police Powers 
Treaty drafters could resolve another analytical divergence in 
the jurisprudence: whether the degree of economic impact is the only 
factor in the analysis of a claim of indirect expropriation.  Some 
tribunals answer that question in the affirmative and apply the sole 
effects doctrine to determine whether an indirect expropriation has 
occurred.  If the measure wipes out all or nearly all of the economic 
value of an investment, then compensation is due, however 
compelling the government’s justification.  According to one 
tribunal, “[t]he effects of the host State’s measures are dispositive, 
not the underlying intent, for determining whether there is an 
expropriation.”50  The tribunal in the case of Metalclad v. Mexico 
favored the sole effects doctrine as it claimed that it was not 
necessary to “consider the motivation or intent”51 of a regulatory 
measure in deciding if an expropriation occurred. 
However, other tribunals take a more nuanced approach and 
consider the State’s purpose in addition to the effects of the measure.  
These tribunals take into account both economic impact and the 
State’s purpose in evaluating whether an indirect expropriation has 
occurred.52  For example, the S.D. Myers tribunal thought it important 
to evaluate “the real interests and purpose and effect of the 
government measure.”53  The LG&E v. Argentina tribunal considered 
these factors in a balancing test: “[t]here must be a balance in the 
analysis both of the causes and the effects of a measure in order that 
one may qualify a measure as being of an expropriatory nature.”54  
 
parties; . . . in consequence, the starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of 
the meaning of the text.”). 
 50.  Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/02/1, Award, ¶ 176 (July 17, 2006); see also Nykomb Synergetics 
Technology Holding AB v. Republic of Latvia, Award, at 33 (Stockholm Chamber 
Com. Arb. Trib. Dec. 16, 2003) (“The decisive factor for drawing the border line 
towards expropriation must primarily be the degree of possession taking or control 
over the enterprise the disputed measures entail.”). 
 51.  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶ 111 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001). 
 52.  See, e.g., Rachel Nathanson, The Revocation of Clean-Energy Investment 
Economic-Support Systems as Indirect Expropriation Post-Nykomb: A Spanish 
Case Analysis, 98 IOWA L. REV. 863, 876 (2012) (“[T]he mixed-effects doctrine . . . 
consists of the sole-effects doctrine plus . . . the police power of the State in 
determining whether an action that affects a foreign direct investment is 
justified . . . .”). 
 53.  S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial Award, ¶ 285 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000). 
 54.  LG&E Energy Corp. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
Decision on Liability, ¶ 194 (Oct. 3, 2006), 21 ICSID Rev. 203 (2006). 
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Still other tribunals consider the purpose of the measure, while giving 
primary consideration to the economic impact.55  Here, again, is an 
instance where States may choose to clarify which rule a tribunal 
ought to apply through the text of their treaties.  A State may opt for 
the sole effects doctrine which tends to favor investors (and arguably 
promote investment), or it may expressly reject the sole effects 
doctrine and instruct tribunals to balance the effect of the measure 
against the State’s purpose, giving the State more room to regulate 
without having to compensate. 
In an effort to define what constitutes an acceptable purpose, 
some tribunals have looked to the character of the measure and 
whether it falls within a State’s traditional police powers.56  
Unfortunately, the precise scope of “police powers” is notoriously 
uncertain and, therefore, problematic. For example, the tribunal in 
Feldman v. Mexico reasoned simply that “governments must be free 
to act in the broader public interest.”57  However, under most existing 
IIAs, acting in the public interest is a specific element of lawful 
expropriation for which compensation is due, not an excuse from 
liability.  Since nearly all government measures have some public 
purpose, application of a broad police powers doctrine would 
essentially render IIA provisions on indirect expropriation 
superfluous.58  States could therefore expressly reserve a precise 
scope of sovereign actions which will not qualify as an indirect 
expropriation (discussed in Part III.B.4, infra). 
 
 55.  See, e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal 
S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, ¶ 7.5.20 (Aug. 20, 
2007) (“[T]he effect of the measure on the investor, not the state’s intent, is the 
critical factor.”) (emphasis added); Compañía de Desarrollo Santa Elena S.A. v. 
Republic of Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, Final Award, at 5 (Feb. 17, 
2000), 15 ICSID Rev. 169 (2000) (considering that “the most significant criterion 
to determine whether the disputed actions amount to indirect expropriation or are 
tantamount to expropriation is the impact of the measure.”); Tippetts, Abbett, 
McCarthy, Stratton v. TAMS-AFFA, 6 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 219, 225–26 (1984)  
(finding that the intention of the government is less important than the effects of the 
measures taken on the investor’s assets). 
 56.  See, e.g., Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award, ¶ 262 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 2006) (finding that it is a part of customary international law that 
the State does not commit indirect expropriation nor should it be liable to pay an 
investor when it adopts measures that are  “commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States”). 
 57.  Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, Award, ¶ 103 
(Dec. 16, 2002), 18 ICSID Rev. 488. 
 58.  Kriebaum, supra note 2, at 726; Ben Mostafa, The Sole Effects Doctrine, 
Police Powers and Indirect Expropriation Under International Law, 15 AUSTL. 
INT’L L. J. 267, 273–74 (2008). 
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In considering the character of the measure, some tribunals have 
required that the measure: (i) confer no direct benefit on the State or a 
third party; (ii) have a bona fide public purpose; or (iii) be 
proportionate to the means pursued.  First, where a  measure results 
in a direct benefit to the State or third party (which looks more like a 
traditional direct expropriation), i.e., “control, or at least the fruits, of 
the expropriated property,” compensation may be due.59  Second, 
where a State merely purports to regulate in the exercise of a bona 
fide public purpose, but is actually pursuing an ulterior purpose, an 
investor’s claim of indirect expropriation may prevail.60  Third, the 
TECMED and Occidental tribunals declined to excuse States from 
liability where the measure was disproportionate, i.e., more restrictive 
or burdensome on private property rights than was necessary to 
achieve its public purpose.61  On the basis of these lines of 
 
 59.  Eudoro A. Olguin v. Republic of Paraguay, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/5, 
Award, ¶ 84 (July 26, 2001), 18 ICSID Rep. 164 (2004); see also Ronald S. Lauder 
v. The Czech Republic, Final Award, ¶ 203 (UNICTRAL Arb. Trib. Sept. 3, 2001) 
(“In addition, even assuming that the actions taken by the Media Council in the 
period from 1996 through 1999 had the effect of depriving the Claimant of his 
property rights, such actions would not amount to an appropriation – or the 
equivalent – by the State, since it did not benefit the Czech Republic or any person 
or entity related thereto . . . .”); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, Partial 
Award, ¶¶ 287–288 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Nov. 13, 2000) (reasoning against a 
finding of indirect expropriation because Canada received no benefit from the 
actions it took). 
 60.  BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 117 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953) (finding as a 
general principle of law that it is inconsistent with the requirement of good faith for 
a State, whilst observing the letter of the agreement, to evade treaty obligations by 
indirect means); see e.g., S.D. Myers, Inc., Partial Award, ¶¶ 152, 194–95 (finding 
that Canada’s restrictions on the export of a dangerous chemical were designed not 
to protect public health and the environment, but rather mainly to protect the 
Canadian disposal industry from U.S. competition); Técnicas Medioambientales 
TECMED S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, 
¶¶ 125, 132 (May 29, 2003), 19 ICSID Rev. 158 (2004) (finding that Mexico’s 
designation of an investor’s landfill site as an ecological area was not for the bona 
fide purpose of protecting the environment and public health, but instead was 
designed primarily to respond to domestic political pressure); Archer Daniel 
Midland Co. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/04/5, Award, ¶ 
150 (Nov. 21, 2007) (finding that Mexico adopted a certain tax not with a bona fide 
public purpose, but rather to protect its domestic sugar industry). 
 61.  See Técnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A., ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2, ¶ 122 (“There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the charge or weight imposed to the foreign investor and the aim sought to 
be realized by any expropriatory measure.”); Occidental Petroleum Corporation and 
Occidental Exploration and Production Company v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, ¶ 450 (Oct. 5, 2012) (finding that the total loss of the 
Claimants’ investment worth many hundreds of millions of dollars was out of 
proportion to the wrongdoing alleged and to the importance and effectiveness of 
the deterrence message the State might have wished to send to the wider oil and gas 
07 - MELLSKE (DO NOT DELETE) 5/6/2015  10:36 AM 
98 MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 30 
jurisprudence, States have the option to appease investors by adding 
express provisions in new IIAs to the effect that regulatory takings 
will be compensated when they confer a direct benefit on the State or 
third parties, do not pursue a bona fide public purpose, or are not 
proportional to the means pursued. 
 3. Legitimate Expectations 
Next, tribunals have considered whether the measure 
complained of was in violation of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations.  Here is another area where States could make 
clarifications in the text of their IIAs.  According to the doctrine of 
legitimate expectations, investors may claim that a reasonable 
investor would not have expected the State to take the measure 
complained of.62  Within this doctrine, some tribunals have required 
the investor to prove that the host State made specific assurances to 
the investor that certain measures would not be taken.63  But even 
then, tribunals have variously accepted a range of assurances in terms 
of “specificity.” 
In terms of greater specificity, the tribunal in Metalclad v. 
Mexico found unambiguous and repeated assurances by the 
government to the individual investor that the investor had obtained 
all necessary permits for its proposed project and on which the 
investor reasonably relied in making its investment.64  When the 
government then decreed the investor’s land a protected ecological 
zone with the effect of barring forever the operation of the landfill, 
the tribunal found that an indirect expropriation had occurred.65  
Other NAFTA tribunals have agreed that legitimate expectations 
must be based on clear and explicit representations made by the 
 
industry). 
 62.  DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 30, at 104–105. But see MTD Equity 
Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7, 
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 67 (Mar. 21, 2007) (“[TECMED’s] reliance on the 
foreign investor’s expectations as the source of the host State’s obligations (such as 
the obligation to compensate for expropriation) is questionable. The obligations of 
the host State towards foreign investors derive from the terms of the applicable 
investment treaty and not from any set of expectations investors may have or claim 
to have. A tribunal which sought to generate from such expectations a set of rights 
different from those contained in or enforceable under the BIT might well exceed 
its powers, and if the difference were material might do so manifestly.”). 
 63.  DOLZER & SCHREUER, supra note 30, at 105–06. 
 64.  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, ¶¶ 28–41 (Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID Rev. 168 (2001). 
 65.  Id. 
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government to the investor66 in the form of targeted representations67 
or even a quasi-contractual inducement.68 
At the other end of the spectrum, however, the Secretary 
General of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID) has said of specific assurances (in the context of 
fair-and-equitable treatment analysis) that “the weight of authority 
suggests that an undertaking or promise need not be directed 
specifically to the investor and that reliance on publicly announced 
representations or well-known market conditions is a sufficient 
foundation for investor expectations.”69  Apparently in between these 
standards, the Thunderbird Gaming tribunal held that informal, oral 
or general assurances can give rise to legitimate expectations, only 
that the threshold for such representations is quite high.70  Here, 
again, the jurisprudence has provided a principle in the form of a 
broad continuum, and States may set their own standards at any point 
thereon in crafting their treaties. 
Insofar as general investment conditions may support an 
investor’s legitimate expectations, they can also undermine 
expectations, as well.  Such has been the case when an investor 
entered a sector which was already heavily regulated, because in that 
environment, the investor should reasonably expect that further 
regulations are likely to occur.  In Methanex v. United States, 
“Methanex entered a political economy in which it was widely 
known, if not notorious, that governmental environmental and health 
protection institutions at the federal and state level . . . continuously 
monitored the use and impact of chemical compounds and commonly 
prohibited or restricted the use of some of those compounds for 
environmental and/or health reasons.”71  In that case, the investor’s 
claims for compensation failed.  Thus, to avoid doubt, States could 
 
 66.  Mobil Investments Canada Inc. and Murphy Oil Corporation v. 
Government of Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/07/4, Decision on Liability and 
on Principles of Quantum, ¶¶ 169–70 (May 22, 2012). 
 67.  Grand River Enterprises Six Nations, Ltd., et al. v. United States of 
America, Award, ¶ 141 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Jan. 12, 2011). 
 68.  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Final Award, ¶¶ 812–813 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. June 8, 2009). 
 69.  Meg Kinnear, The Continuous Development of the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment Standard, in INVESTMENT TREATY LAW: CURRENT ISSUES III 228 
(Andrea Bjorkland et al. eds., 2009). 
 70.  International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. United Mexican States, 
Separate Opinion, ¶ 32 (UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Dec. 1, 2005). 
 71.  Methanex Corporation v. United States of America, Final Award of the 
Tribunal on Jurisdiction and Merits, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 9 (UNICTRAL Arb. Trib. Aug. 
3, 2005). 
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expressly include (or reject) in the text of their IAAs the concept of 
“legitimate expectations,” define the degree of specificity of relevant 
assurances, and indicate whether, and to what extent, general 
investment conditions may be relevant to those expectations. 
 4. Measures to Protect Public Welfare 
There seems to be consensus that the narrowest definition of 
police powers may excuse the State from liability for indirect 
expropriations, not merely in the public interest, but more 
specifically to protect public health, safety, and the environment from 
the harmful use of an investor’s property.72  For example, the 
Methanex tribunal held that a California ban on a gasoline additive, 
which was contaminating drinking water and posing a significant risk 
to human health and safety, was a lawful non-compensable 
regulation, under general international law.73  In Chemtura v. 
Canada, the tribunal held that that a ban on lindane, a chemical used 
in pesticides, “motivated by increasing awareness of the dangers 
presented by lindane for human health . . . is a valid exercise of the 
State’s police powers and, as a result, does not constitute an 
expropriation.”74  One commentator who promotes the sole effects 
doctrine still would create a carve-out from indirect expropriation for 
regulations, and even bans, on an investor’s chemical that represents 
a serious threat to human health.75  Professor Dolzer agrees: “In 
certain grave situations of imminent danger to the public, states have 
required measures with far-reaching effects on property without 
offering compensation. . . .  Obviously, in those settings a balancing 
of the interest, rather than the severity of the effect on the owner, led 
to the decision to deny compensation.”76  Likewise, in the trade 
context, GATT Article XX allows States to impose trade measures 
 
 72.   See M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 
357 (2d ed. 2004) (finding that regulatory interference with an investor’s property 
rights “does not constitute compensable taking in situations in which public harm 
has already resulted or is anticipated”); Andrew Newcombe, The Boundaries of 
Regulatory Expropriation in International Law, 20 ICSID REV. 1, 29 (2005) (“[N]o 
right to compensation arises for reasonable necessary regulations passed for the 
‘protection of public health, safety, morals or welfare . . . .”). 
 73.  Methanex Corporation, Final Award of the Tribunal on Jurisdiction and 
Merits, pt. IV, ch. D, ¶ 7. 
 74.  Chemtura Corporation v. Government of Canada, Award, ¶ 266 
(UNCITRAL Arb. Trib. Aug. 2, 2010). 
 75.  Mostafa, supra note 58, at 290–91 (explaining that measures implemented 
to protect others, or to avoid infringement of others’ rights, against certain uses of 
the investor’s property are non-compensable based on the Latin maxim sic utere 
tuo ut alienum non laedas, or ‘use your property so as not to damage another’s’). 
 76.  Dolzer, supra note 2, at 80. 
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that would otherwise conflict with broader GATT provisions to the 
extent that they are necessary “to protect” human health or 
exhaustible natural resources.77  Here, again, States may draft IIA 
language to define a narrow scope of police powers within which 
regulatory measures that are designed to protect human health and the 
environment from the harmful use of an investor’s property are non-
compensable.  At the other end of the spectrum, States may draft 
provisions for direct and indirect expropriation so that public 
purpose, non-discrimination, and due process make direct 
expropriations lawful (for which compensation is due) and make all 
otherwise indirect expropriations non-compensable regulation.78  The 
former option tends to favor investors, while the latter favors States, 
with room in between for careful calibration of each treaty’s text. 
 C. New Treaties 
In view of the Philip Morris cases and the objections by some 
that investment arbitration could unduly subvert state sovereignty, 
one might expect Australia and Uruguay to expressly adopt and reject 
certain of the foregoing principles, and set higher thresholds for 
violations, in their recent IIAs.  To some extent they have, 
particularly at the intersection of indirect expropriation and public 
health.  In recent IIAs with Korea,79 both countries added separate 
annexes80 specifically defining certain parameters of indirect 
expropriation beyond the traditional short definition in the body of 
the treaty.81 
First, with respect to the impact of the measure, these new IIAs 
expressly invoke the term “indirect expropriation” to confirm that 
regulatory takings are covered.  However, although these treaties 
 
 77.  General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs art. XX,  Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 188. 
 78.  UNCTAD, Expropriation: UNCTAD Series on Issues in International 
Investment Agreements II, 95, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/IA/2011/7 (2012). 
 79.  Free Trade Agreement, Austl.-S. Kor., Apr. 8, 2014, [2014] ATS 43 
[hereinafter Austl.-S. Kor. FTA]; Agreement on the Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, S. Kor.-Uru., Oct. 1, 2009 [hereinafter S. Kor.-Uru. Agreement]. 
 80.  These annexes are substantially similar to those in the U.S. and Canada 
Model BITs of 2004, demonstrating a growing tendency of States to clarify the text 
of IIAs with respect to indirect expropriation. Austl.-S. Kor. Free Trade 
Agreement, supra note 79, annex 11-B; S. Kor.-Uru. Agreement, supra note 79, 
annex; DEP’T OF ST., 2004 Model BIT (2004), annex B, 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf; 
CAN., Canada 2004 Model BIT (2004), annex B.13(1), http://www.italaw.com/doc
uments/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf. 
 81.  Austl.-S. Kor. FTA, supra note 79, art. 11.7; S. Kor.-Uru. Agreement, 
supra note 79, art. 5. 
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provide a standard definition—“equivalent effect” —they do not go 
so far as to clarify whether an interference with property rights must 
be total or partial, permanent or temporary, or, in the case of an 
enterprise, whether some or all of the “control elements” must be 
impaired.  On each point, the States entering the new treaties could 
have set the standards in their favor (by requiring absolute and 
permanent interference, and impairment of all control elements, for a 
claim of indirect expropriation) or in favor of investors (by expressly 
allowing claims to proceed based on partial or temporary 
interference, or impairment of only some of the control elements).  
But to do so might discourage investment in the former case and 
unduly restrict State action in the latter, so leaving these terms 
undefined may have been an intentional choice by the drafters. 
Second, with respect to the purpose of the measure, these 
treaties tip the scales in favor of States by rejecting the sole effects 
doctrine.  The treaties provide that economic impact, standing alone, 
does not establish that an indirect expropriation has occurred.  
Instead, the treaties require the tribunal to consider the character and 
purpose of the measure, as well.  However, the treaties do not 
expressly provide as an element or basis for an investor’s claim 
government measures which are not bona fide or which confer a 
direct benefit on the State or third parties. Only the Uruguay treaty 
adds an express proportionality limitation on government measures, 
thus affording some additional comfort to investors relative to the 
Australian version. 
Third, the treaties expressly require tribunals to consider the 
investor’s legitimate expectations.  The States could have expressly 
rejected this basis for an investor’s claim, but elected not to do so.  
However, following Methanex, the treaties indicate that legitimate 
expectations may not be founded where the relevant industry is 
already heavily regulated.  Still, they do not address or settle the 
question of whether specific assurances are required, much less 
indicate the requisite degree of specificity to support an investor’s 
claim.  However, adopting express language that would allow claims 
based on legitimate expectations for general government statements 
and market conditions might create unmanageable exposure to State 
liability; expressly allowing claims based on specific assurances 
might discourage States from making commitments needed to attract 
a particular investment.  Here, again, the drafters may have 
intentionally left the precise definition of specific assurances to the 
discretion of tribunals. 
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Fourth, the States devote a separate clause carving out from 
indirect expropriation those regulatory actions which protect—as 
compared to actions merely “in the interest of”—public welfare 
objectives such as health, safety, and the environment.  Although 
both treaties indicate in footnotes that, “[f]or greater certainty,” the 
list of public welfare objectives is not exhaustive, these narrower and 
more manageable formulations of police powers, defined in terms of 
“protection,” show these States expressly reserving a space—albeit a 
narrow one—for non-compensable regulatory action to protect public 
health. 
Based on these considerations, it is clear that States like 
Australia and Uruguay are paying attention to the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals and refining the text of each new treaty they enter to provide 
more clarity as to their common intent regarding both the protection 
and the regulation of foreign investment.  States have not taken these 
calibrations to the extreme, however.  To do so might run the risk of 
either discouraging foreign investors from investing in the first place 
or, on the other hand, creating a definitive bar on certain State action.  
It may well be that the drafters intended certain terms to remain 
undefined to promote investment flows and to permit State action, 
with room to negotiate and settle or arbitrate any eventual dispute.  In 
other areas, however, where these countries’ earlier treaties were 
silent, they now speak up about important legal issues such as the 
relevance of the States’ purpose in enacting a measure in addition to 
its effects; the validity of an investor’s expectations, tempered by the 
degree of existing regulations in an industry; and the ability of the 
States to take measures to protect public welfare objectives including 
public health. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Over several decades, international investment tribunals have 
developed principles and concepts, which sketch the contours and 
content of “indirect expropriation.”  That jurisprudence may be 
enough for investors and States to make their cases; or, if it is not, 
States like Australia and Uruguay have shown they are willing to 
elevate some of those principles and concepts to the status of primary 
international law through express statements in the text of their 
treaties.  In choosing which principles and standards to include, 
States provide greater certainty in their next-generation IIAs about 
the scope of a State’s discretion, and the basis of an investor’s 
potential claims, particularly when it comes to regulations designed 
to protect public health.  These new treaties show that States and 
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tribunals are working through an iterative process of careful treaty 
drafting and interpretation which results in an increasingly nuanced 
balance of investors’ and States’ interests.  The process reinforces the 
sovereignty of States, the legitimacy of ISDS, and the advancement 
of the rule of international law.  Most importantly, through ever more 
studied and sophisticated treaty drafting, the international regime of 
ISDS provides greater certainty and confidence for both investors and 
States to commit to long-term investments for the sustainable 
development of participating States.82 
 
 
 82.  Cf. JAN PAULSSON, THE IDEA OF ARBITRATION 263 (2013) (“The value of a 
reliable process is immeasurable.  Its highest importance is not that it furthers the 
interests of trade and industry.  Rather, its grand achievement is to provide a basis 
on which international economic exchanges can be carried out in confidence, in a 
manner that allows development on a long-term basis—long-term financing, long-
term investment, long-term joint enterprise, transfer of technology and know-how 
to be repaid over the long term.  Without faith in the reliability of contracts, none of 
these could flourish.  International transactions would be reduced to primitive 
instances of cash-and-carry, and would no longer be commensurate with the 
demands of trade, innovation, and economic development necessary to feed, clothe, 
and shelter our planet’s growing population.”). 
